Saturday, February 7, 2004

The Civil War in New Mexico

Part 1 - Confederates on the Rio Grande

Paul Harden For El Defensor Chieftain

It is said there are more books and articles on the American Civil War than any other subject. This article is yet another. Of the thousands of books, only a handful discuss the Civil War as fought in New Mexico. These books and articles also seem to begin with the words "When the Civil War broke out ..." as if it were a case of hives or the measles. In New Mexico, the Civil War didn't just "break out." The Union Army had anticipated the arrival of the Confederate Army for months.

The first Civil War battle on New Mexico soil occurred on Feb, 21, 1862, in Socorro County near Fort Craig. Afterwards, the Confederates established a hospital in Socorro, flew their flag over the plaza for over two months, and buried their fallen soldiers at both Valverde and Socorro.

This three-part series presents the history of the Civil War in New Mexico, much of which involved Socorro County. It is the story of extreme hardships, defeats and disappointments of both the Blue and the Gray armies. Although, the hardships experienced by the Confederate Army in New Mexico ("The Texans") is unparalleled in Civil War history. It is an enigma why this story is overlooked in most historical accounts of America's most infamous war.

WHEN THE CIVIL WAR

BROKE OUT

In early 1861, there were over 5,000 Army officers and men in the Territory of New Mexico, including present-day Arizona. Many men with southern sympathies were furloughed, or simply left, to enlist in the Confederate Army. This dropped the army's strength in New Mexico to about 3,500 men.

Major Edward Canby became the commander of the Department of New Mexico in June 1861. Canby, extremely loyal to the Union, proved to be an excellent operational officer during this time, reorganizing the Union Army of New Mexico. In the event of a Confederate invasion, he knew he must consolidate his army into a large fighting force to defend the territory. Canby immediately ordered the abandonment of most forts and camps in the territory. All personnel and supplies were relocated to Forts Fillmore, Union and Craig, with only small detachments left in Santa Fe, Albuquerque and Ft. Stanton. Anticipating an invasion coming up the Rio Grande from the south, most men and supplies were transferred to Fort Craig, south of Socorro. By July, Ft. Craig was home to over 2,000 soldiers and growing, now the largest fort in the southwest.

BAYLOR'S COMMAND ARRIVES

On July 1, 1861, the first of the Confederates arrived at Ft. Bliss. These were 400 men of the 2nd Regiment, Texas Mounted Riflemen, commanded by Lt. Col. John Baylor. This small force did not overly concern Canby, as Ft. Fillmore, near Mesilla, was manned by Maj. Isaac Lynde and 700 men of the U.S. 2nd Infantry. Canby reiterated his orders to Lynde to defend Ft. Fillmore, as his well-supplied superior force provided a tactical advantage over the Texans. He sent a large supply train of food, supplies and ammunition to bolster Lynde's confidence.

On July 25, about 300 of Baylor's men entered Mesilla, only four miles from Ft. Fillmore. Maj. Lynde and 380 of his men crossed the river and confronted Baylor's men. A short skirmish ensued, killing three Union soldiers and injuring six others. Lynde immediately retreated back to the fort.

THE ABANDONMENT OF

FORT FILLMORE

Believing he could not defend Ft. Fillmore against Capt. Teel's artillery, from Baylor's command, Maj. Lynde ordered the abandonment of the fort the following day. After midnight on July 27, all 700 men of the U.S. 2nd Infantry, including the women and children living at the fort, began the strenuous march across the desert towards Ft. Stanton, 150 miles distant. Fort Fillmore, the first Army fort built in southern New Mexico (established 1851), had been abandoned against Canby's orders.

Lynde's plan was to travel the 22 miles to San Augustine Springs in the Organ Mountains, the mounted men arriving first to take water back to the marching infantry. However, once the sun rose, the men quickly became dehydrated and fatigued before reaching the springs. The 100-degree heat of July was taking it's toll.

The hot, dry weather also lifted columns of dust as they marched along the road, spotted by the Texans in Mesilla. Baylor took pursuit with about 200 of his command, quickly catching up to the fleeing Union army. Many eagerly surrendered for a drink of water. Baylor captured Lynde at San Augustine Springs. Lynde surrendered the entire union command of 700 men to Baylor's 200, considered an act of cowardice that disgraced Lynde's army career well beyond the Civil War.

After being paroled by Baylor, Lynde returned to his Vermont home, being removed from military service and charged with "abandoning his post at Fort Fillmore ... and surrendering his command to an inferior force of insurgents." In 1866, Lynde was exonerated of these charges by President Ulysses S. Grant.

A week after Lynde's retreat, Col. Baylor declared all of New Mexico south of the 34th parallel to be the Confederate Territory of Arizona, with Mesilla the capitol and himself, naturally, the governor. Socorro, however, lies about four miles north of the 34th parallel.

The loss of Ft. Fillmore galvanized Canby's resolve to defend the territory. He reorganized the 1st and 2nd Dragoons into mounted cavalry units, requested additional troops from the War Department, and ordered Col. Carson to begin recuiting men for the New Mexico Volunteers. Carson, who spoke fluent Spanish, recruited about 1,000 Mexicans from the Mesilla Valley, San Antonio (N.M.), Socorro, Polvadera, La Joya — even southern Colorado. Carson, of course, was the famous Col. Christopher "Kit" Carson.

By mid-October, Col. Carson was training 1,200 New Mexico Volunteers at Ft. Craig. This is an important distinction, as many historians claim the local Mexicans were apathetic over the Civil War affair. As a volunteer, one must leave their families for extended periods of time, provide their own rifles and ammunition, clothes, horse, tack and feed, with little or no pay from the military. Hardly the sacrifices made by an apathetic people!

THE SIBLEY BRIGADE

Canby's fear of a large invasionary force was being secretly organized by his old friend, Col. Henry Hopkins Sibley. After resigning his commission in Santa Fe, Sibley traveled to Richmond and presented a plan to gain control of the entire southwest, establish a seaport at Guymas, and thus establish a reliable supply route for the Confederacy — far away from Union forces. Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate States of America, approved Sibley's plan, promoted him to brigadier general, and financed the Confederate Army of the Southwest.

In August, Gen. Sibley arrived in San Antonio, Texas, to recruit men for the Sibley Brigade. In October, the march to New Mexico had begun. By Christmas day, 1861, nearly 3,200 Texans, carrying the Confederate flag, had passed through Ft. Bliss.

In January 1862, Sibley began moving his men to abandoned Fort Thorn on the Rio Grande (a few miles north of present day Hatch), leaving detachments to defend Ft. Bliss, Franklin (El Paso), Mesilla and Doña Ana.

MEANWHILE ...

BACK AT THE FORT

Col. Canby was receiving intelligence of the whereabouts of Sibley's men. Canby was no doubt growing quite nervous about 3,600 enemy soldiers (Sibley's and Baylor's men combined), with artillery, supply wagons and mounted cavalry, only 90 miles away from Fort Craig. Canby knew Fort Thorn was an excellent tactical site to assemble an attacking army. From there, the Texans could easily march to Fort Craig in four or five days along the Rio Grande and/or the Jornado del Muerto.

Capt. Graydon's Independent Spy Company, along with Capt. Rafael Chacon's company of New Mexico Volunteers, constantly patrolled the area on both sides of the Rio Grande, looking for enemy spies, an advance party, or the arrival of the enemy forces. They saw nothing. The month of January dragged on with no movement by either side. Both camps were full of bored soldiers, enduring snows and unusually cold temperatures. Inspite of the inactivity, both sides knew well that war was in the air.

THE MARCH TO

FORT CRAIG

On the morning of Feb. 7, 1862, Sibley's buglers rang out the orders to "move out." Col. Green's 2nd Regiment, accompanied by Capt. Teel's artillery, left first as the advance guard. The following day, Col. Suttons's 3rd Regiment hit the trail. Col. Scurry's 1st Regiment, Maj. Pyron's artillery and the supply wagons left on the 9th. Like the march across Texas, the command was spread out over several days to ration the watering holes along the way.

Capt. Graydon's Independent Spy Company spotted Green's advanced guard shortly after their departure from Ft. Thorn. They shadowed the Texans keeping Canby informed of their movements. Graydon was a bold, colorful character and extremely effective in obtaining intelligence for Canby. To determine the size of the invading army, Graydon sent some of his Mexican aides into Sibley's camps, disguised as peddlars selling apples. Their instructions were to speak only in Spanish, listen only in English, and to count the number of men in any language they wished. They returned with the fairly accurate estimate of "about 3,000 men."

Col. Green's regiment arrived a few miles south of Fort Craig on the afternoon of February 14, joined on the 15th by Sutton's command. Both camped on the southern edge of Milligan Gulch, so close to Ft. Craig that each army could occasionally hear the other when the wind was calm. Fearing a morning attack — with the 1st Regiment and supply wagons still a day or two behind — he sent an express messenger to deliver marching orders to Col. Scurry.

The messenger found the 1st Regiment at Alamosa Creek about sundown. They had marched all day and were setting up camp in a mild snow storm. Immediately the men were ordered to break camp and commence a forced march to Ft. Craig. The poor men of the 1st Texans, hungry and tired from their day's travel, marched all night an additional 35 miles, through a blustering snow storm.

They arrived at Green's command at daybreak on the 16th, utterly exhausted. Records compiled by the author indicate five men died on the night of this forced march. Green thanked the men for their exemplary service, then apologized that his fear of an imminent attack was premature. After a hearty breakfast, the 1st Regiment fell quickly into sleep, no doubt grumbling wicked thoughts towards the otherwise well-liked Col. Green.

Later that afternoon, Green moved some men and artillery to the north side of Milligan Gulch, clearly within sight of the fort, and fired off a few rounds to test the Union commander. Canby responded with a few bow-shots himself, along with several companies of cavalry storming the Texans. Green and Sutton quickly retreated, as did Canby's men.

The new defensive fortifications around Ft. Craig, plus the estimated strength of 4,000 men, made Sibley's plan to attack the fort quite impractical. Canby had extensive earthworks added, in late 1861, to effectively throw off Sibley's familiarity with the fort. (The large dirt walls and trenches around today's Ft. Craig were dug by hand during this time). Several actions were attempted to lure Canby's army out of the fort to no avail. Canby knew he was controlling the situation by remaining in the fort, protecting his assets and denying Sibley a pointless battle.

On Feb. 17 and 18, the Texans hunkered down in their camps due to incredibly strong winds and blowing dust. On the morning of the 19th, instead of launching another feint, the entire Texan command abruptly moved to the southeast, crossed the Rio Grande and camped outside the village of Paraje. Sibley was counting on seizing Ft. Craig to replenish his shriveling supplies. Feeding an army of nearly 3,000 men was dwindling his supply wagons fast. Leaving Ft. Craig, his plan was now to seize food and supplies along the Rio Grande from Socorro to the federal stores at Albuquerque, while leaving part of his command to barricade Ft. Craig — in effect, to starve the men out of the fort, although, that could take months.

On the morning of Feb. 20, the Texans marched about 15 miles north on the east side of the river, then up a long sandy ravine. It was a tough day for the men, often having to pull the supply wagons and artillery through the deep sand and lava rock by hand. Once atop the high plain, they made a dry camp on the Jornada del Muerto trail south of Black Mesa. The camp was in plain view of the men at Ft. Craig, being high on the ridge due east of the fort, and within canon range.

Canby's intention was to intimidate Sibley to ensure the enemy force would move on the following day, which he did by sending several companies to skirmish with the Texans, late that evening. This also denied Sibley access to the water in the Rio Grande for his men and animals. Capt. Graydon and a few men of his Spy Company approached the camp with two mules packed with explosives. The incident, recorded by U.S. Capt. George Pettis, reads as follows: "(Graydon) finally arrived within 150 yards of the picket-line, and everything being in readiness, the fuses were fired, and the captain and his party commenced their retreat, when to their consternation they found that the mules, instead of going toward the enemy, were following themselves; the shells soon began to explode, the Confederate camp was quickly under arms to repel an attack, and Paddy Graydon and his companions made their way back to Fort Craig with the loss of the two mules."

THE BATTLE OF VALVERDE

On the morning of Feb. 21, 1862, several hundred men launched a ruse attack against Ft. Craig to disguise the fact that the bulk of the command was traveling towards the river, crossing at Valverde. Canby was not fooled. At the crack of dawn, he had dispatched about 1,800 men, under the command of Col. Benjamin Roberts, to the Valverde crossing, a step ahead of Sibley's actions. Lt. Col. Crane, in the book "Ft. Craig," observed "Canby always seemed to know what the Confederates were doing, while Sibley always appeared to be in the dark about Union intentions." Canby had Capt. Graydon's Independent Spy Company, and the New Mexico Volunteers on reconnaissance patrols, to thank for his "clairvoyant" intelligence. Apparently, Sibley had no such organized element of intelligence- gathering.

Col. Roberts, commanding the U.S. 2nd and 3rd Cavalry, along with two batteries of artillery, arrived at the north end of Black Mesa about 9 a.m., just as Maj. Pyron, commanding the advance guard of the 2nd Texas Mounted Volunteers, serendipitously arrived as well. The two opposing forces eyed each other and promptly opened fire. The battle of Val Verde had begun.

The Texans rushed down the slopes towards the river as the U.S. Calvary forded the Rio Grande. Opening up with musket fire, they killed many of the Union soldiers and horses while crossing the river. Capt. McRae's and Capt. Hall's batteries quickly repelled the Texans back into the trees along the old river bed with artillery fire. The ear-shattering blasts of the 12- and 24-pound Howitzers also quickly alerted the rest of Sibley's Brigade and the 2,000 men still at Ft. Craig, that a battle was underway. If you have ever attended an artillery demonstration by the New Mexico Civil War Re-enactors, you have a sense of the racket a few canons can make. The sound can travel for miles.

Thousands of troops from both camps, following the sounds of the canons, arrived at the battlefield over the next several hours. During this time, little advance was made by either side, mostly due to the blazing Union artillery. It was more of a large-scale skirmish than a skilled battle plan. About noon, as snow began to fall, Capt. Teel's artillery arrived on the battlefield and began to challenge the Union dominance. It is curious why Sibley had no artillery with the advance guard.

Over the next couple of hours the fighting escalated, with Col. Roberts doing a fair job of containing the Texans to the trees and bushes along the old riverbed. The Texans kept firing away, but seemingly with little organization or leadership. Historical records show this was indeed the case, as before noon Gen. Sibley "took sick with an unknown illness and retired to his ambulance," leaving Lt. Green in command. However, it is not clear if Green was yet on the battlefield.

About 2 p.m., one of the more brutal events took place. Capt. Lang's elite Lancer Company, armed only with 9-foot lances and sidearms, made a mounted charge on some men in the center of the field. Lang assumed these men to be an inexperienced company of New Mexico Volunteers. Instead, this was Capt. Dodd's company of skilled Colorado Volunteers, known as the Pike's Peakers.

Dodd's men met Lang's charge with a rain of fire and bayonets, decimating the lancers, killing all 42 of their horses, 12 men and eight men seriously wounded (four later died from their wounds). Dodd lost half his men as well.

About 3 p.m., several actions occurred that changed the battle theater greatly. First was the arrival of 900 men of the 2nd Texas Regiment. Green, now clearly in command of the Texans, began repositioning his men into better tactical positions. Finally, the Texans had some leadership.

Secondly, was the arrival of Col. Canby with an additional 1,500 regulars and New Mexico Volunteers. Canby took command of the Union forces, relieving Col. Roberts. Canby moved McRae's battery to prevent the Texans from advancing to the north. This action actually caused the opposite effect, as Green moved his Texans northward to counteract McRae's fire. This spread the Texas line to nearly a half-mile long. This was a major tactical error by Canby, failing to appreciate the confinement of the enemy Col. Roberts had maintained most of the day, forfeiting the Union's advantage.

Once in position, Green ordered the attack on Canby's forces, which became a costly blow to the Union. The Texans came pouring out of the trees, yelling and screaming, with everything they had, blasting away with artillery, grape shot and squirrel guns. This quickly pushed the Union elements across the river.

Particularly bloody was the attack on McRae's battery by Maj. Lockridge. After several attacks from the charging Texans, Capt. McRae and over half his artillery company had been killed. Maj. Lockridge lay dead on the field as well. The Texans captured the battery, turned the guns around, and began firing on the former owners. The captured McRae's Battery became the prized possession of Sibley's Brigade until long after their return to San Antonio, Texas, many months later.

The advancing Texans of Green's forward attack totally disorganized Canby's army. In total confusion, many of the regulars and New Mexico Volunteers retreated back to the west side of the Rio Grande, leaving those remaining perilously exposed. Combined with watching McRae's artillery battery fall into Confederate hands, Canby had seen enough. About 5 p.m., he ordered a full retreat of his men back to Ft. Craig.

About sundown, a detachment of New Mexico Volunteers made a surveillance patrol to the site of the Feb. 20th Texan campsite. To their surprise, many supply wagons, while mostly abandoned and virtually unattended, were left at the dry camp — they set about 20 supply wagons afire. While only a small victory for the Union, losing the supply wagons was a large blow to the already depleted Texans. Remnants of the burned wagons and dozens of "fire circles," still lay atop the sandy campsite to this day. This site is now part of Ted Turner's Double Eagle buffalo ranch.

AFTERMATH

OF THE BATTLE

The Battle of Valverde was credited to the Texans, based largely on the Union retreat. The Texans had about 2,600 men at the peak of the battle. Col. Green reported Confederate losses as 36 killed and 150 wounded. Green's largest loss was more than 600 horses killed in the battle. After Valverde, many of the Texans were converted to infantry troops, due to the huge loss of horses.

Canby's peak strength was about 3,800 men, with about 500 remaining at Ft. Craig. Col. Canby's official report of the battle lists 68 killed, 160 wounded and 35 missing.

However, historians meticulously researching the battle, such as John Taylor and Martin Hardwick Hall, have listed the Texan's casualties as 72 killed, 157 wounded and 9 missing, with Union casualties as 111 killed, 160 wounded and 204 missing (most captured by the Texans), or about a 10 percent loss to both armies.

The foregoing is obviously a very abbreviated description of an eight-hour battle. Several historical books describe the battle in detail, but unfortunately, most are out of print. An excellent description of the battle is contained in the 240-page book, "Fort Craig," recently published by the Bureau of Land Management. Copies of the book are available at the Socorro Field Office of the BLM, which covers other historical aspects of Ft. Craig as well. "Rebels Along the Rio Grande," by Don Alberts and "Bloody Valverde," by John Taylor are also highly recommended for further reading.

SOCORRO

VETERANS

There are no complete muster rolls for the New Mexico Volunteers indicating the home town of the soldiers. If one of your ancestors fought at the Battle of Valverde, or with the New Mexico Volunteers, please contact the El Defensor Chieftain or the author. We'd like to include a list of any known Socorro descendants in Part 2 of this article.

Next Month

Part 2 (due out March 6) will cover the occupation of Socorro, the Socorro Hospital, the advance to Ft. Union, and the Battle of Glorietta. Part 3 (April 3) will conclude with the Confederate retreat, the recapitulation of Socorro, and the return to San Antonio. You'll just have to wait until April to find out who won the Civil War!

Some of the references used in this portion of the article: "Fort Craig," Bureau of Land Manage-ment; "Bloody Val-verde," John Taylor; "Rebels on the Rio Grande," Don Alberts; "The Confederate Army of New Mexico," Martin Hardwick Hall; "Desert Tiger: Captain Paddy Graydon," Jerry Thompson; "Legacy of Honor," Jacqueline Meketa; "The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico and Arizona," George Pettis; "Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies" (128 volumes), Government Printing Office; and field work by the author.

E-mail this story Printer-friendly version